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1 • Appeal uisregard existing law when it 
determined . - ^rosecutoi ' <? closing arguments \ not 
constitute misconduct and merit reversal when the prosecutor 
snpri fira] ].<> d jur ec ted the ']\\Y /"" , ;\. /.ion to line inappropriate use 
01 prior convictions of the Defendant? 
.,•':. In light of the order of Judge Kenneth Rigtrup, entered 
a fter the ("our I 3. • a I s> decision :. •* -- • * 
of the Pre-Trial Motions and the record which now reflects tnat the 
pre-trial motion ^r
 ximit the use of •; *\v • i^r -or.v:cMons was 
denied, should 1: jpreme Court now review ; e c : ^ 
Court -)t Appeals which denied the Defendant's challenge to the 
lowe? ] i ir e to suppress ev:i < leiice of h :i s pr i or convi ct:i •• :)iis 
because the record did not- indicate that the motion had been 
denied* 
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PETITION WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the fcmrt of Appeals :i n State of Utah v. 
Raymond Ortiz. which was fi led October 3, ] 98 9, 
88803 78 • CIS i i i at ;, 1: .ac :hed I: i< n < * t >, On November 1 1 989, the Petitioner 
filed a Petition for Rehearing in the Court of Appeals which was 
denied on November J.989. ? 
ehearing is attached hereto as Appendix "B". 
After -.earing . November 11. I'IH', Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
suppl* t'conl, /I, (jpy of1 h.is order, is 
attached hereto as Appendix "i" , 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Rehearing 
which was timely filed on November 9, 1989. The Petition for 
Rehearing tolled the period in which this Petition for Write of 
Certiorari must be filed. Rule 45(c), Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court provide that this Petition is timely filed and the Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 78^2-2(5) (Supp. 
1988) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by this 
Court on March 21, 1989. Originally, this case was an appeal from 
a judgment and conviction in the Third Judicial District in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
presiding. 
The Defendant-Appellant was charged in an Information with 
Two Counts of Theft, a Second Degree Felony, and was convicted of 
both Counts. After trial, the Court sentenced the Defendant on one 
Count after granting the Motion of the Defendant to sentence on 
both Counts of being part of a single criminal episode. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the Appellant's opening brief at 
pages 3 to 9. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant-Appellant respectfully submits that a Petition for 
Rehearing should be granted in this case for two reasons. The 
2 
first reason i *= based upon an opportune ty to a] 3 ow the Defendant-
Appell an t: t:< )plemeiil I he nscor ci concer ni ng tl le : 
trial court which in relation to the motion to exclude evidence of 
the Defendant's prior convictions* The second ^ based upc- j ne 
Utah Supreme Court decision or state v« Thomas, ~ - \r 
1989). 
ARGUMENT 
THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REHEARD AFTER 
THE FULL RECORD IS BEFORE THE COURT 
AND THE COURT CAN THEN DETERMINE IF 
THE ALLEGED ERROR WAS PREJUDICIAL 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" i s a copy of an order by the 
Third District Court granting the Defendant's Motion to Supplement 
lln KtM;uii! I IlkiI document dicates that the txi^ rnnrt 
denied the Defendant Motion Limine. Therefore, this Court 
should review the matt - the cor rec 
supplemented record. 
The Defendant further submits that the court misconstrued and 
• • «- . state v. "Thomas, Tl le conduc t: 
of the Prosecutor uneguivocally called to the attention of the 
jurors matters *. ^ W.-H-1 • no- he justified i n their 
i: i;! 11111 d e r a I j 11, ' • ha rm 1 e s s 
because the testimony )efendant d: : n, intent should 
have been considered fairly without the improper argument by the 
record now indicates that the 
Defendant; -:.:: not tirsr t)r*«;g ; . s conviction before the jury until 
after the court denied :• -v* "i I I i ni i I" flu-: ust- ul llm 
3 
conviction• 
The decision of the Court of Appeals allows the Prosecutor to 
improperly argue the use of felony convictions and then hide the 
error behind the standard cautionary instruction which is given in 
any case about the use of the felony convictions* The Defendant's 
convictions were received for only a specific purpose, over his 
objection, and not for the purpose which the Prosecutor argued to 
the jury in this matter* The Supreme Court and this Court in a 
long line of decisions have been very cautious and careful in 
allowing the use of felony convictions for improper purposes under 
the Rules of Evidence* See, State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep* 
12 (Utah, 1988) and State v* Parsons, 119 Utah, Adv* Rep. 19 
(Utah, 1989)* The court should not allow the decision of the 
Court of Appeals to water-down that precedent. 
The Defendant-Appellant submits, based on the supplemental 
record that justice requires the Court to re-evaluate both Point 
I and Point II of the prior decision by granting the Petition for 
Certiorari. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PRETRIAL 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR CONVICTION FOR 
THEFT BY DECEPTION. 
Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a pretrial Motion to limit 
evidence of prior convictions under Utah Rules of Evidence 609. 
(Transcript of Pretrial Motions of 3-31-88, page 2.) The Defendant 
had been convicted in November, 1987, with the felony offenses of 
4 
Communications Fraud and Theft by Deception, and the defense made 
a pretrial Motion to limit this evidence which was heard by the 
trial Court and denied. (See Supplemental Order) The Curt of 
Appeals did not decide this issue because of the defective record. 
The Defendant argued that under the authority of State v. 
Gentry, 747 P.2d, 1032 (Utah, 1987), and Rule 609 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, that the prior convictions in Utah for Theft by 
Deception must be excluded in the pending Theft by Deception 
matter. In Gentry* the Supreme Court held that in an aggravated 
sexual assault trial, the Defendant's prior rape conviction should 
have been excluded at trial. After noting that the crime of rape 
did not inherently reflect the Defendant's credibility, the Court 
stated: 
Also significant is the similarity between the 
conviction and the crime for which defendant was tried, 
aggravated sexual assault. This was highly likely to 
prejudice jurors and unduly influence their conclusion 
concerning defendant's guilt. 
Counsel for the Defendant Ortiz, argued in support of the Motion 
as follows: 
So I would submit that the Court cannot, just 
because the prior offense is Theft by Deception or 
Communications Fraud, determine that they are necessarily 
involving dishonesty or false statements. 
Finally, I think that under Rule 403, that this 
Court has discretion to use the weighing factors set 
forth in Subparagraph (1) of Paragraph (a) to determine 
even if it's an offense that involves dishonesty or false 
statements. That under Rule 403, which is — the Court 
can still determine that the prejudicial effect and the 
prejudicial effect of having similar offenses coming in 
against Mr. Ortiz if he takes the stand outweighs the 
probative value. The Court's inherent power under Rule 
403 to control the trial would also give the Court power, 
and we'd ask the Court to grant the motion on that basis. 
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The Court denied the Motion and allowed the Defendant to be 
examined about the conviction. The Defendant testified on direct 
questioning concerning the conviction in an attempt to mitigate the 
result of the Court's ruling. 
In the recent case of State v. Wight (Case Number 87-558-CA, 
Utah, 1988) the Court of Appeals extensively reviewed the federal 
decision concerning Rule 609 of the Rules of Evidence. Indicating 
that the new Utah Rules of Evidence were intended to provide a 
fresh starting place, the Court followed interpretations given to 
Rule 609 by the federal cases of United States v. Carroll, 663 F. 
Supp. 210 (D. Md. 1986) and United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F. 2d 
1049 (D.C. Cir., 1983). This case is now in conflict with the 
precedent of the Wight decision. 
In Wight, the Court indicated that under 609 (a)(2) inquiry 
should be made regarding the particular facts involved to determine 
if honesty was a factor. If the trial court finds honesty is 
involved in the underlying offense, evidence of the prior 
conviction is automatically admissible under 609 (a)(2). 
The critical consequences of denying the Motion to Exclude 
the Evidence in the context of this case is graphically illustrated 
by the manner in which the prosecutor used the conviction in 
closing argument. The record reflects the following argument to 
the jury: 
MR. IWASAKI: The fact that a witness has been convicted 
of a felony and/or convicted of a crime involving 
dishonest or false statement is to be used by you only 
in weighing his credibility. 
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I'm not saying, "Find Mr. Ortiz guilty of Theft by 
Deception because he's previously been convicted of Theft 
by Deception, and he's previously been convicted of a 
Communications Fraud. 
Even though the dates of those convictions are less than 
a year apart in 1985, 1986, and now, he's also charged 
in 1987 with identical crimes, that is not the purpose 
of the felony convictions. That is to be used only if 
you find and believe that such a fact indicates a person 
is more likely to tell a falsehood to question his 
credibility. 
I've heard other arguments in other cases where it says, 
"Well, look if he gets on the stand and has to admit to 
those felonies and take the risk of being convicted on 
that, he must be telling the truth." Well, he obviously 
didn't change his behavior from 1985 to 1986. 
MR GAITHER: I am going to object, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. IWASAKI: The testimony is not believable, and it is 
a basis for you to look at the prior felony convictions. 
(Transcript of the Trial, page 151). 
Therefore, the Court should review this matter by granting the 
Writ of Certiorari. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Court of Appeals did not have the full record 
before it, Mr. Ortiz respectfully petitions this Court to grant 
certiorari and reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new 
trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of December, 1989. 
RANDALL GAITHER 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
7 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
was mailed to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, by depositing same in the U.S* Mail, 
postage prepaid* 
Dated this day of , 1989 • 
8 
Cite as 
118 UUk Adv. Rep. 75 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Raymond ORTIZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 880378-CA 
FILED: October 3, 1989 
v. Ortiz CODE»C 
Provo, Uti 
OPINION 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Defendant appeals from his conviction of 
theft by deception, a violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-405 (1978). Defendant com-
ends that evidence of his prior convictions was 
improperly admitted, that the prosecutor's 
comments in dosing argument were prejudi-
cial, and that these errors constituted grounds 
for a new trial. Defendant also contends that 
the evidence was insufficient to support a 
conviction. We affirm. 
In Jury 1987, Reginald Corona, owner of 
"Reggie's Rock'N R" bar located in Murray. 
Utah, became acquainted with defendant at 
Eagle Tire, a tire shop located near his bar. 
Defendant indicated to Corona that he had 
just purchased Eagle Tire by borrowing money 
through the Small Business Administration 
(SBA). Corona told defendant that he was 
also interested in obtaining an SBA loan for 
approximately $350,000 to $400,000. Defen-
dant informed Corona that he knew someone I 
who could get an SBA loan for him. Defen-
dant told Corona he would have to "front 
some money to show that [he] was in good 
faith," and that he had advanced $10,000 to 
get his loan. Defendant also told Corona that 
with the exception of "points," Corona would 
have his $10,000 returned upon qualifying for 
the loan. Corona told defendant to speak with 
his contact about getting the loan. 
Sometime later, defendant informed Corona 
that his contact agreed to arrange for the loan. 
Defendant agreed to transfer all the necessary 
documents between Corona and the contact 
telling him that the contact supervised the 
SBA loan department at Valley Bank & Trust 
Co. (Valley Bank). 
Defendant later contacted Corona and told 
him be needed $5,000 to complete the paper-
work for the loan. Defendant asked that the 
$5,000 be delivered to him personally in cash. 
Corona delivered a cashier's check for $5,000 
made payable to defendant. When Corona 
inquired, defendant assured him that he had 
received the check and had spoken with the 
contact. 
In August 1987, defendant informed Corona 
that his contact required another $5,000. This 
time Corona made the cishier's check payable 
to Richard L. Gray because that was the name 
on the Valley Bank business card attached to 
Corona's loan papers. Defendant returned the 
check and told Corona that Gray did not want 
his name involved in the transaction and that J 
Corona should make out a new check payable ] 
to defendant. Corona provided the new check 
to defendant. 
Sometime after Corona delivered the second 
check, defendant told Corona he needed a co-
signer for an SBA loan to rent equipment. 
Corona became suspicious as defendant ha 
previously told him he had already obtaine 
the SBA loan. Corona called Gray at Vallc 
Bank and was informed that there were n 
records of any loan applications from him. 
Corona pursued defendant in an attempt t 
get his money back but was unsuccessfu 
Corona did not receive an SBA loan as 
result of his transactions with defendant. 
At trial. Gray testified that standard pro< 
edures for obtaining an SBA loan did n< 
include fee advancements of $5,000 or $10,00 
and that he did not receive any fees froi 
either defendant or Corona. Carl Vil 
Warnock, a commercial loan specialist for th 
SBA, testified that he searched all SBA Ioa 
applications for the months of July an 
August 1987 and found none relating t 
Corona, "Reggie's Rock'N R," or defendani 
He also testified that $10,000 in advance fei 
is not a prerequisite for an SBA loan. 
Defendant was convicted of two counts c 
theft by deception after a jury trial held o 
March 31,1988. 
PRIOR CONVICTIONS 
Prior to trial, defendant presented a motio 
in limine, seeking to exclude evidence of hi 
prior convictions of communications frau 
and theft by deception. The trial court too 
this motion under advisement, but nothing i 
the record shows that the judge ever ruled o 
the motion. Defendant argues that the motio 
was denied and that the trial court erred 1 
admitting the evidence of his prior convict 
ions. However, defendant first offered test 
mony of his prior convictions on direct ex* 
mination. Defendant argues that this was a 
attempt to mitigate the result of the court' 
ruling. 
Without a record of a ruling below, w 
cannot review the trial court's alleged erroi 
"A general rule of appellate review in crimini 
cases in Utah is that a contemporaneous obj 
ection or some form of specific preservatioi 
of claims of error must be made a part of th 
trial court record before an appellate com 
will review such claim on appeal." State v 
77//man, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). Se 
also Boston v. State, 185 Ga. App. 740, 36 
S.E.2d 885, 887 (1988); Stare v. Cordova, 10 
N.M. 643, 674 P.2d 533, 536 (Ct. App. 1983) 
and DeLeon v. State, 758 S.W.2d 621, 62 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988). Where the court has no 
made a ruling on a motion in limine, an< 
where defendant fails to invoke a ruling on hi 
motion, he has waived the issue for purpose 
of appeal. DeLong v. State, 185 Ga. App 
314, 363 S.E.2d 811, 811-12 (1987), cert 
denied 185 Ga. App. 909. "As a general rule i 
is the objecting party's obligation to obtain . 
ruling on the objection, or such objection i 
waived on appeal." Fixico v. State, 735 P.2< 
580, 583 (Okl. Ct. Crim. App. 1987). In th 
case at bar, defendant did not invoke a ruling 
CODE*Co 
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nor did defendant object upon introduction of 
the evidence of prior convictions because he 
was the one to first introduce this evidence. 
Without a record of the ruling upon the 
motion in limine or of timely objections, we 
are left with nothing to review. 
PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's 
comments about defendant's prior convictions 
made in closing argument constituted grounds 
for a mistrial. During his closing argument, 
the prosecutor stated: 
The fact that a witness has been 
convicted of a felony and/or 
convicted of a crime involving dis-
honest (sic] or false statement b to 
be used by you only in weighing his 
credibility. 
I'm not saying, "Find Mr. Ortiz 
guilty of theft by deception because 
he's previously been convicted of 
theft by deception, and he's previ-
ously been convicted of a commu-
nications fraud. 
Even though the dates of those 
convictions are less than a year 
apart in 1985, 1986, and now, he's 
also charged in 1987 with identical 
crimes, that is not the purpose of 
the felony convictions. That is to be 
used only if you find and believe 
that such a fact indicates a person is 
more likely to tell a falsehood. To 
question his credibility. 
I've heard other arguments in other 
cases where it says, "Well, look, if 
he gets on the stand and has to 
admit to those felonies and take the 
risk of being convicted on that, he 
must be telling the truth.* Well, he 
obviously didn't change his beha-
vior from 1985 to '86. 
At this point, defense counsel objected and the 
objection was sustained. The prosecutor closed 
with, 'The testimony is not believable, and it 
is a basis for you to look at the prior felony 
convictions.* 
The two prongs of the test for determining 
whether a prosecutor's actions and remarks 
constitute misconduct and merit reversal are: 
1) if the actions or remarks call to the atten-
tion of the jurors matters they would not be 
justified in considering in determining their 
verdict, and 2) under the circumstances of the 
particular case, the error is substantial and 
prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence there would have 
been a more favorable result for the defen-
dant. State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445, 447 
(Utah 1989) (citing Stare v. TTHman, 750 P.2d 
at 555); See also West Valley City v. RJslow, 
736 P.2d 637, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In 
determining whether the prosecutor's remarks 
to the jury about defendant's prior recent 
convictions were in error, we note that defense 
counsel first elicited testimony concerning the 
prior convictions in direct examination of the 
defendant: v 
Q. Now, you were—do you 
remember when you were arrested 
and charged for this situation? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. And about when was that? 
A. November. 
Q. Of what year? 
A. Of 1987. 
Q. Now, prior to November of 
*87, had you been convicted of 
prior felonies? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And on or about June 27th of 
1987, bad you been convicted of a 
communications fraud felony? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And August 1st, 1985, had 
you been convicted of a theft by 
deception felony? > , , 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Had you ever communicated 
to Mr. Hansen anything about your 
criminal record? 
A. Yes he knew. 
Q. Did he know about that? 
A. Yes. 
Later, the prosecutor raised the issue of the 
prior convictions on cross-examination. 
Defense counsel did not object. In his dosing 
arguments, the prosecutor was not calling the 
jury's attention to new matters, but was 
merely discussing matters that had already 
been before the jury twice. Furthermore, the 
prosecutor reminded the jury that the evidence 
of the prior convictions could only be used for 
credibility purposes. 
Finally, the possible prejudice caused by the 
prosecutor's comments was mitigated by the 
court's instruction: 
You are instructed that the fact that 
a witness had been convicted of a 
felony and/or convicted of any 
crime involving dishonesty or false 
statements is to be used by you only 
in weighing his credibility, and it is 
to be so used only if you find and 
believe that such a fact indicates a 
person is more likely to tdl a fals-
ehood. 
"(!]f there had been any implication adverse to 
the defendant, the trial judge gave an appro-
priate cautionary instruction which it should 
be assumed that conscientious jurors would 
follow.' State v. Trusty, 28 Utah 2d 317, 502 
P.2d 113, 115 (Utah 1972). Therefore, we find 
that any prejudicial error that occurred during 
the closing remarks was harmless. 
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
In a jury trial in a criminal proceeding, w< 
review the evidence and all inferences which 
may reasonably be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the jury verdict. Statt 
v. Petrec, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). *W< 
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evi« 
dene* only when the evidence, to viewed, h 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently impro-
bable that reasonable minds must have enter 
tained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convi 
cted.* 7o*. See also State v. Lamm, 606 P.2c 
229, 231 (Utah 1980); State v. Daniels, 5 * 
P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah 1978). Defendani 
contends that the evidence was insufficient tc 
prove intent and to support the jury verdio 
but be provides no analysis, no citation to th< 
record, and no supporting case law. We hav< 
consistently held that if counsel on appea 
does not provide citations to the record, w< 
need not reach the merits of his or her subst 
antive claims. See, e.g.. Arnica Mut. las. Co 
v. Schett/er, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah Ct. App 
1989). 
We affirm the trial court and hold tha 
defendant's prior convictions were properl; 
admitted and that the prosecutor's closinj 
remarks did not rise to the level of prejudio 
warranting a new trial. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo-
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Raymond Ortiz, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER DENYING REHEARING 
Case No* 880378-CA 
Appellant's petition for rehearing is hereby denied. 
DATED this r> day of November, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT 
^AA(2C^ 
Mary K\ Noonan, Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of November, 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING DENIED 
was deposited in the United States mail. 
Randall Gaither 
Attorney for Appellant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
R. Paul Van Dam 
State Attorney General 
Elizabeth Holbrook 
David B. Thompson 
Assistants Attorney General 
B U I L D I N G M A I L 
DATED this 8th day of November, 1989• 
By —^-/-^ £/^ <££- * /*£*) 
X Deputy Clerk 
L 
Third Judicial District 
RANDALL GAITHER #1141 
Attorney for Defendant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-1990 G 
NOV 3 0 1989 
I *^l/^# 
0ftfX*ty< 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
RAYMOND ORTIZ, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant* 
ORDER SUPPLEMENTING THE 
RECORD 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Civil No. CR88-163 
The above-entitled case came for hearing before the Court on 
Defendant's Motion to Supplement the Record on Monday, November 13, 
1989. The State of Utah was represented by David Thompson of the 
Attorney Generals Office and the Defendant was present court 
represented by Randall Gaither, Attorney at Law. Based upon Rule 
30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 12(h) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the record in this case, which was 
remitted on November 8, 1989, from the Utah Court of Appeals back 
to the trial court, is supplemented as follows: 
1. On March 31, 1988, the Defendant argued to the trial court 
a motion concerning the use by the Prosecution of prior 
convictionTof Communication Fraud and Theft by Deception under Rule 
609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence* (See transcript of Pre-Trial 
Hearing, Pages 2 and 3.) 
2. The Defendant, through his counsel, argued that under 
Rule 609, sub-paragraph (a), the Court was to make a weighing 
process concerning the probative value of admitting the evidence 
and that the Court could not merely because of the title of the 
prior offenses of Theft by Deception or Communication Fraud, find 
that the offenses involved dishonesty or false statements. 
(Transcript of 3/31/88, Page 5 and 6) 
3. The Defendant also moved the Court under Rule 403 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence to determine the prejudicial effect of the 
convictions in a case involving similar offenses against Mr. Ortiz. 
(Transcript of 3/31/88, Page 6) 
4. The Court took the matter under advisement indicating that 
the Court would review the rules on the case and advise the 
Defendant prior to the point in trial that evidence would become 
admissable. (Transcript of 3/31/88, Page 10) 
5. The Defendant indicated to the trial court that would 
admonish the prosecution not to allow into evidence any reference 
to the prior convictions until the Court made a ruling on the 
motions. (Transcript of 3/31/88, Page 11) 
6. The Court, off the record and without making any findings 
of fact or making any reference on the record to any factors 
concerning the Court's decision, denied the Defendant's pre-trial 
motion to limit the use of prior convictions of the Defendant. 
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DATED this 3D day of n<yv^JUh^ , 1989, 
BY THE COURT: 
Jk. HON.) KENNETH District Court 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was mailed to David Thompson, Assistant Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
Dated this £g-_ day of 
^ 
1989. 
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